

SIDC OPSCOM Report

Automatic Partial Decoupling of Intraday Auction IDA1 for Delivery Date 17/06/2026

17.06.2026

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1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.

1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through

Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.


At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.

Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.


MCSC Daily Timeline

SDAC – SIDC – IDA daily timeline



SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

IDA timeline



1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, shipping agent, explicit participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA

Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting Intraday Auction 1 (IDA1) on 16/06/2026, which resulted in Automatic Partial Decoupling. The incident was caused by the absence of the OMIE Orderbook (OBK) in PMB by the Automatic Partial Decoupling (APD) deadline.

The root cause was that the impossibility for Red Eléctrica (REE) to finalize the security analysis before 14:55 was identified only after the deadline for partial decoupling case (Manual PD during session because of TSO security analysis issue).

2.1 Course of Events

2.2 Timeline

| Event | Start | End |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| OMIE contacted REE by phone to inquire whether they were experiencing any issues because of the lack of results from the TSO Security Analysis on OMIE side. | 16/06/2026; 14:50 | |
| REE called back OMIE to inform that they would not be able to finish the TSO Security Analysis in time. So, OMIE could not participate in IDA1. | 16/06/2026; 14:56 | |
| Triggering of Incident Committee. | 16/06/2026; 14:56 | 20/05/2026; 15:22 |
| The APD was performed and only GME and HENEX remained coupled. | 16/06/2026; 15:12 | |
| The IDA NEMO Coordinator sent the operational message IDA_JOINT_08: Delay in IDA Results Publication. | 16/06/2026; 15:20 | |

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| IDA session completed. | 16/06/2026; 15:22 | |
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2.3 Incident Cause

This incident was caused due to the impossibility for Red Eléctrica to finalize the security analysis before 14:55. This was identified only after the deadline for triggering the Manual PD during the session because of TSO security analysis issue. This prevented the publication of the day-ahead security analysis results before the deadline required for OMIE to participate in IDA1. Consequently, OMIE was unable to generate the Order Book, leading to the triggering of the Automatic Partial Decoupling process.

2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

Impacted NEMOs:

All except GME and HENEX.

Impacted Bidding Zones:

All Bidding Zones except IT and GR.

Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:

All borders except the IT-GR borders and Italian internal borders.

3. Mitigation Measures And Lessons Learnt

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

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| Short-term Solution by Affected Party | <p>Red Eléctrica continuously monitors and improves their internal processes.</p> |
| Long-term Measures by Affected Party | <p>No long-term corrective measures have been identified following completion of the investigation. The effectiveness of the implemented short-term actions will continue to be monitored, and any need for permanent measures will be reassessed if warranted by future operational experience.</p> |
| SIDC Project Lessons Learned | <p>There is no bullet proof solution to completely avoid an impact on IDA1. However, the newly approved procedure is expected to mitigate the frequency of Automatic Partial Decouplings in future events.</p> |